Into this wonderful land, during these three kaleidoscopic centuries, came the natives of almost every nation of Asia, some curious, some ambitious, some mercenary, some because they were obliged to come… There were Indian Buddhists in abundance, but also Persian priests of varying faith… Turkish princelings pondered the ways of gem dealers from Oman; Japanese pilgrims stared in wonder at Sogdian caravaneers – from The Golden Peaches of Samarkand by Edward Schafer
This week’s Sinica Podcast features a conversation with Thomas Fingar, a veteran diplomat and intelligence analyst, and Mike Lampton, Professor Emeritus of Chinese studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and former president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. I spoke with them about an essay they’d published in the Washington Quarterly that focused on how the U.S.-China relationship soured and what might be done about it. It’s a worthwhile read, and the podcast conversation is very much worth listening to.
One section of their essay stood out for me in particular. It’s a section in which Fingar and Lampton describe two “constellations” of Chinese behavior between which China oscillates:
The historically dominant constellation prioritizes national and regime security. This package posits a hostile and threatening external environment and emphasizes achievement of relative economic autarky, tighter domestic social control, ideological conformity, a leader-in-charge approach to governance, and deep suspicion of foreigners. These concerns yield policies which limit the capacity of social groups (domestic and foreign) to act in China without central sanction. When this constellation prevails, China imposes more restrictions on foreign trade and investment, civil society, and religion. This policy cluster highlights and seeks to reduce the country’s vulnerability to western influence and subversion. Other characteristics of this constellation include tendencies toward cult of personality and strong-man rule, Party/State dominance, and greater reliance on instruments of hard power. In phases that prioritize security concerns, China acts in accordance with Machiavelli’s dictum that it is better to be feared than liked — at home and abroad. The regime stokes and exploits nationalism by extolling its own accomplishments and exaggerating the malign intent of foreign forces. This is the China that we see today.
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